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The OLI theory [6] determines that MNEs should
have an ownership advantage, location advantage and
internalisation advantage before OFDI and should
become the theory that explains OFDI in emerging
countries early in their development. The Investment
Development Path theory [18] indicates that a country's* Institutional quality was introduced as a dummy for policy lib-
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ment and summarises the characteristic five stages of
FDI/OFDI; only if the GDP per capita reaches
3000e4000 US dollars (approximately 7000e8000 in
US dollars today) will the OFDI begin to scale.
However, the Investment Development Path theory is
contrary to the fact that a large quantity of OFDI
throughout the world comes from emerging markets,
such as China and India, where the income level is low.
The phenomenon may result from the promoting
function of government and the financial advantage
from excessive foreign exchange reserves under the
condition of a domestic institutional void and the
relative lag of economic development (large in gross
but low on average), realising a leapfrog development
path for its OFDI. In addition, some other emerging
countries that have reached the required per capita
income still strongly promote the OFDI, such as Brazil
and Russia.niversity, Dalian University of Technology, Kokushikan University.
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central economy and a short time market economy, so
a large proportion of state-owned enterprise exists and
the market mechanism is not perfect. Once OFDI is
treated as a native economic strategy, the strong power
and administrative methods from the government will
still promote the international firms under the condi-
tion of a low level of economic development. How-
ever, in developed economies, because of the sound
institutional quality (IQ), high economic development
and core technology controlled in firms, the support
from government declines into a secondary position.
The dynamic process reminds us that a nonlinear in-
fluence of economic development on OFDI comes
into being, which depends on a certain level of insti-
tutional quality in the economy, causing a first
increased then decreased development path. The dy-
namic process is also a valid supplement to Dunning's
IDP theory.
Based on this background, the paper integrates the
institutional quality (including the strength of legal
rights index, the overall institutional reform, the pri-
vatisation process and trade openness) into the eco-
nomic development stage, extends the IDP theory
effectively, and utilises a regression model based on
the concept of dynamic panel threshold model (DPTM)
and dynamic panel to test the nonlinear influence and
leapfrog development characteristic of OFDI using
country specific institutional quality as a threshold.
Our fitted model allows the relationship between eco-
nomic development and OFDI to be piecewise linear,
with the IQ as a regime-switching trigger. Using cross-
country data from 73 economies from 2000 to 2008,
we find strong evidence of threshold effects in the
economic-development-OFDI link. Specifically, we
find that the strong promoting effect of economic
development on OFDI begins only when the IQ is
within a certain interval. At this time, the strong ben-
efits of economic development exist.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 re-
views the literature, and further development of our
hypothesis is presented in Section 3. Section 4 dis-
cusses the results and performs a series of robustness
tests, in which we explore alternative measures of IQ,
while Section 5 provides some conclusions.
Review of the literature
The influence of institutional factors on OFDI
The OLI theory usually supposes that the MNEs
should have ownership advantages before OFDI, whilethe IDP theory emphasises in which stage the MNEs
from emerging economies may begin to invest abroad.
However, for the characteristics of asset-seeking pur-
pose and leapfrog development, the former theories
appear to be lacking full explanatory power. The
research in OFDI of Russia finds that we must augment
the traditional OLI and IDP theory and must introduce
the country specific institutional factors to the theories
[11]. In addition, the theory should embed three types
of explanatory variables into the MNE theories:
imperfect capital markets, special ownership advan-
tages, and institutional factors [5,17]. The research of
Buckley [5] found that the liberalisation of government
policy has a significant effect on Chinese OFDI,
emphasising the importance of institutional factors.
However, in this paper, only dummy variables are used
to capture the change in institutions, so in later
research, continuous, endogenous institutional vari-
ables are used to explain OFDI in emerging countries.
All of the studies found important evidence that spe-
cific institutional reforms, such as the liberalisation of
trade and foreign exchange, privatisation, competitive
reform and overall institutional reform, will affect
OFDI in emerging markets significantly. Further, the
range of the study extends from emerging countries,
such as China, India, and Russia, to Malaysia,
Thailand, Latin America, Central Europe, East Europe
and all emerging countries. The extant framework of
theories also extend from traditional ideas (OLI, IDP,
Natural-based view, and internationalisation theory) to
LLL theory, the strategy tripod (resource, industry, and
institution), imperfect capital markets, special owner-
ship advantage and institutional factors embedded in
traditional MNEs theories.
The influence of financial factors on OFDI
Froot [8] first proposed the question of low effi-
ciency in financial markets and explored the effect of
exchange rate on FDI. Later, many reports in the
literature started to focus on effect of exchange rate on
transnational M&A in the condition of financial in-
efficiency and then extended to other aspects for
finance and FDI [1,12] or the financial development in
country level [2]; subsequently, reports studied the
influence of firm specific capital cost on FDI [7],
constructed the relationship between financing and
domestic OFDI on a theoretical basis [10,14], and
combined country specific financial advantage and firm
specific financial advantage to explore enterprises’
foreign investment in the condition of financial
constraints.
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one can distinguish between two main groups of
mechanisms, whereby a firm's financing may have an
effect on its propensity for undertaking FDI: reactive
and proactive firm behaviour [13]. The first group re-
fers to opportunistic firm behaviour in response to
financial market imperfections. The second group
contains measures that were undertaken to improve the
availability of capital and/or to lower the cost of cap-
ital. Oxelheim [13] took imperfect international
financial integration as their point of departure. They
assumed a two-tier world capital market with partial
segmentation, where a local firm can choose to stay in
its home market and face the local cost of capital or
invest in ‘proactive financial strategies’ to interna-
tionalise its cost of capital and reap the benefits of the
economies of scale and scope attributable to a multi-
national firm. Such financial strategies may include
cross-listing its stock in a more liquid stock market,
foreign issuing of equity and/or debt, and ‘bonding’
strategies to reduce information asymmetries. These
types of strategy, they suggest, may foment a financial
advantage vis-a-vis competitors e or eliminate a
financial disadvantage e which can be exploited by
undertaking FDI. Tolmunen and Torstila [16] study one
such proactive strategy. They found that European
firms that have cross-listed their stock in a US stock
market are significantly more likely to make acquisi-
tions in the US. They interpret the results in terms of
the European firms' need for a viable ‘M&A currency’
and their need to reduce information asymmetries, and
overcoming home bias. The above study presented
another way of stating the need to reduce a financial
ownership disadvantage.
Data and methodology
Data
The data set consists of cross-country observations
for 73 economies (46 emerging countries and 27
developed countries, presented in Table 3) from 2000
to 2008. All data were extracted from the World Bank
Database (WBD) or Economic Freedom of the World:
2010 Annual Report and expressed as the percentage
of GDP, except IQ, GDP per capita, and hr. As for
the financial factors, we focus only on the credit
market and equity market because they are the most
feasible sources of financing for the majority of
emerging and developed countries in our sample.
Similar to Stoian [15]; we utilise the strength of legal
rights index (slr), which measures the degree to whichcollateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of
borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending; slr
has a range from 1 to 10 (1 ¼ weak to 10 ¼ strong)
(see Table 1).
Methodology in the empirical research
There are two items that must be addressed when
constructing a dynamic PTM. First, one of the re-
gressors is the lagged dependent variable, which makes
our model a dynamic panel model (DPM). If we use
the regular fixed-effect model of panel model analysis,
then there would be bias caused by the correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the resid-
ual. To address this bias, we use the system generalised
method of moment (GMM) proposed by Blundell and
Bond [4] to conduct the estimation. Second, if the
panel data are nonlinear, then one must use PTM to
reveal the properties. Overall, the two questions can be
solved individually, and if they were to be solved
simultaneously, then the residual may have an auto-
correlation problem. Overall, we estimate the model
using two steps: (1) the static PTM (see Ref. [9] and
(2) the DPTM. Once g is identified, estimates of the
slope parameters follow as bðg∧Þ: Finally, we test the
significance of threshold g via a model-based boot-
strap, the validity and properties of which have been
established in Ref. [9].
In step 1, we utilise the static PTM proposed by
Hansen [9] to explore the nonlinear characteristic of
the panel data. If we were to assume that there is only
one threshold in the model, then the model can be
expressed as
yi;t ¼ mi þ b'1xi;tI

qi;t  g
þ b'2xi;tIqi;t>gþ ei;t ð1Þ
where mi is the country fixed effect; xi;t is the exogenous
variables; qi;t is the threshold variable, i¼ 1…N denotes
the country; t ¼ 1…T denotes the time; and g is the
threshold value. Ið,Þ in Eq. (1) is the indicator function.
If the condition in the parentheses holds, then I ¼ 1;
otherwise, I ¼ 0.
Assume b ¼ ðb'1; b'2Þ' and define the xi;tðgÞ as
xi;tðgÞ ¼

xi;tI

qi;t  g

xi;tI

qi;t>g
  ð2Þ
Then we can simplify Eq. (1) as
yi;t ¼ mi þ b'xi:ðgÞ þ ei;t ð3Þ
For each i, take the average of Eq. (3); then we
derive
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we can write Eq. (5) as
Y* ¼ X*ðgÞbþ e* ð5Þ
The residual is be*ðgÞ ¼ Y*  X*ðgÞbb; and the sum
of the squared error S*1ðgÞ is
S*1ðgÞ ¼ e*ðgÞ'e*ðgÞ ð6Þ
To obtain the optimal threshold value, one can
repeat the estimation process described above, using
the g within the possible value range to achieve S1ðgÞ:
The g value that corresponds to the minimum S*1ðgÞ is
the optimal threshold value bg:
The estimator matrix of the threshold regression isbqðbgÞ; the residual is be*ðbgÞ; and the residual variance
is
bs2¼ 1
NðT  1Þbe*1bgbe*bg¼ 1NðT  1ÞS*1bg ð7Þ
After we obtain bg; we must test for the existence of
the threshold effect. The null hypothesis is H0 : b1¼b2:
In step 2, we use the GMM method proposed by
Blundell and Bond [4] to conduct the estimation. We
transform the PTM in the first step into a linear panel
data model. By using the dummy variable, we can still
reveal the nonlinear characteristic identified in step 1.
In addition, we add yi;t1 as one of the regressors; as a
result, our model is the DPDM with a nonlinear
characteristic. Following the specification of Eq. (5)
and by adding y1
*
i;t ð¼ y*i;t1Þ as one of the regressors,
we specify the model as follows:
y*i;t ¼ mi þ ry1*i;t þ b'1x*i;tDVðR1Þ þ b'2x*i;tDVðR2Þ þ e*i;t
ð8Þ
Y* ¼ Y1*rþXR*bþ e* ð9Þ
where DV(R1) and DV(R2) are the dummy variables
that denote regimes 1 and 2, respectively, and the values
of the dummy variables come from the PTM estimation
in step 1.
Before conducting the GMM estimation, we must
ascertain whether the orthogonal condition holds. The
condition is:
E
h
y1*1;ts

e*i;t  e*i;t1
i
¼ 0 s¼ 2; :::; t 1; t ¼ 3; :::;T
E
h
xR*1;s

e*i;t  e*i;t1
i
¼ 0 s¼ 2; :::; t 1; t ¼ 3; :::;T :
ð10ÞIt is obvious that as t becomes larger, the number of
orthogonal conditions increases. Rewriting Eq. (10)
into a matrix, we obtain Eq. (11):
E
h
W*i '

e*i;t  e*i;t1
i
¼ 0 i¼ 1; :::;N: ð11Þ
Let the GMM estimator matrix be bqðbr '; bb 'Þ and
bq ¼ XR*'W*ANW*'XR*1XR*'W*ANW*'Y ð12Þ
In Eq. (12), AN ¼ ½ð1=NÞ
PN
i¼1W
*
i 'HW
*
i 1; where
H is a (T-2)  (T-2) matrix.
Model specification and empirical results
Model specification
According to the depiction in Section 3, we define
our basic model to capture the influence of economic
development on OFDI, utilising IQ as a threshold:
ofdiit ¼aþfofdiit1þb'1investitþb'2financeit
þb'3controlitþb4gdp,Iðr1 : iq<g1Þ
þb5gdp,Iðr2 :g1 iqg2Þ
þb6gdp,Iðr3 : iq>g2Þþ εit
ð13Þ
where ofdi is outward foreign direct investment over
GDP from 2000 to 2008; invest is an investing indicator
vector that includes the annual fixed assets investment
over GDP (fix), annual R&D investment over GDP (rd),
and foreign direct investment over GDP (fdi); finance is
a financial development indicator vector that includes
private credit amount over GDP (credit) and stock
market value over GDP (stock); control is a vector of
controlling variables hypothesised to affect OFDI,
which includes human capital (defined as average years
of secondary years, hr) and natural resource (defined as
total amount of natural resource stock over GDP, na-
ture). In our model, the IQ indicators act as sample
splitting variables. The above specification allows the
effects of GDP per capita on OFDI to take on different
values, depending on whether the level of IQ is smaller
or larger than the threshold g, and the corresponding
coefficients are b4, b5, and b6.
Empirical results
According to the principle of the panel threshold
model, we estimate the model under the hypothesis of
no threshold, single threshold and double thresholds at
the significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The results are presented in Table 2, indicating that
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Variables Mean S.E Min Max
Investment
indicators
OFDI 3.1811 7.076 e 89.450
FDI 5.1579 6.811 e 92.670
Fixed assets 21.711 5.047 10.37 42.540
R&D 1.0784 1.021 e 4.7700
Financial
development
Private
credit
73.9902 53.88 e 319.56
Stock value 48.351 69.53 e 442.79
Controlling
variables
IQ 5.7656 2.390 1.000 10.000
GDP/capita 14.237 15.36 0.370 87.340
Openness 94.106 63.10 20.49 456.65
Natural
resource
9.5134 13.15 e 39.290
Human
resource
21.842 15.08 e 85.000
Table 2
LM-test for the threshold effect.
LM-test F-value P-value 1% 5% 10%
Null 14.947*** 0.0000 9.5628 4.3905 2.6224
Single 7.1688** 0.0375 8.4970 3.2273 2.0309
Double 1.21 0.5349 7.3171 3.1569 1.9219
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nonlinear effect of economic development on OFDI
using IQ as a threshold. The calculated thresholds are 4
and 8.
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Eq. (13)
using slr as a threshold variable. Double thresholds (4
and 8) exist in the model, so the sample can be split
into three groups. Countries with a slr of less than 4 are
classified into the low-IQ group (usually less devel-
oped countries simultaneously accompanied by low
economic development), those with slr of more than 8Table 3
Regression results.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
OFDI(-1) 0.9347*** 0.0456 0.9251*** 0.042
Credit 0.0467*** 0.0039
Stock 0.0267*** 0.001
FDI
RD 0.1325 0.0221 0.1341 0.024
Fix 0.0284 0.0021 0.1009 0.011
Hr 0.0704 0.0051 0.0494 0.002
Nature 0.0126 0.0013 0.0118 0.001
Gdp(r1) 0.057 0.0051 0.0867 0.006
Gdp(r2) 0.1662** 0.0184 0.181*** 0.019
Gdp(r3) 0.0385 0.0027 0.0223 0.002
***, **, and * represent significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respective
respectively. The s.e. denotes the robust standard error of each variable.are classified into the high-IQ group (usually devel-
oped countries), and the others are classified into the
middle-IQ group (most emerging countries). The co-
efficients on GDP per capita presented in Table 3 are
all insignificant in the low-IQ group; thus, they are
consistent with the prediction of IDP (nearly no pro-
motion from economic development and government);
the coefficients in the middle-IQ group are more sig-
nificant and larger than those in the high-IQ group, that
is, promotion from most emerging country govern-
ments is stronger than that in developed countries in
the condition of an institutional void. As a result, the
promotion of economic development to OFDI is usu-
ally larger in the emerging countries, realising a leap-
frog development path. This result is also beyond the
prediction of IDP because it occurs regardless of the IQ
factors and is also a valid supplement to IDP. The
promotion function of the government in developed
countries decreases, that is, the country specific
advantage is not significant, and the capital account
tends to converge, which is consistent with the pre-
diction of IDP theory. Regarding the effect of financial
development on OFDI, both the credit market and the
stock market will promote OFDI. Although both co-
efficients of the financial markets are significant, the
credit market is more influential than the stock market.
This difference is because a bank dominated financial
system exists in emerging markets, while a capital
dominated financial system exists in developed mar-
kets. In addition, in our sample, the number of
emerging countries is greater than the number of
developed countries.
Two robustness checks are performed for the main
regression. First, we assess the effect of outliers on the
estimation results. Following the idea proposed byModel 3 Model 4
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
4 0.9149*** 0.0415 0.8978*** 0.0408
0.0206* 0.0015
9 0.011** 0.0009
0.3083*** 0.0152 0.2765*** 0.0121
6 0.1026 0.0115 0.1058 0.0132
2 0.1313* 0.0124 0.1754** 0.0129
2 0.0443 0.0036 0.0333 0.0031
1 0.0256 0.0026 0.0316 0.0031
9 0.0969 0.0072 0.1926 0.0191
5 0.1827*** 0.0219 0.1803*** 0.0199
1 0.0356 0.0024 0.114** 0.0119
ly; r1, r2, and r3 represent the low IQ, middle IQ, and high IQ groups,
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countries with high combinations of residuals and
leverage statistics. Excluding the outliers does not
change the basic format of Eq. (1). Second, we test
whether the middle-IQ group can be split further into
subgroups2. The result presents an insignificant p-value
of 0.651, which suggests that a three-regime specifi-
cation is adequate. Therefore, the previous interpreta-
tion is unchanged and stable.
Conclusion
We presented new evidence on the role that institu-
tional quality plays in mediating the impact of economic
development on OFDI based on data from 73 countries
from 2000 to 2008. One contribution of the paper is the
adoption of the regression model based on the idea of a
dynamic panel threshold effect to capture the rich dy-
namic change in the relationship between economic
development, OFDI and institutional quality. We found
that the strong promoting effect of economic develop-
ment on OFDI begins only when IQ is within a certain
range; in addition, we found that the strong promoting
effect of economic development on OFDI is a valid sup-
plement toDunning's IDP theory. As the IQ increases, the
promotion function of the government decreases, causing
a nonlinear effect on OFDI. The low IQ accompanied by
low economic development (less developed countries)
will not promote OFDI significantly. This result is
consistent with the prediction of IDP theory. When IQ
increases, the influence of economic development on
OFDI in emerging countries is larger than that in devel-
oped countries, utilising IQ as a threshold. This result
indicates that a strong promotion from government exists
in the case of an institutional void. This finding underlines
the importance of government to formulate effective in-
stitutions to encourage OFDI and realise a leapfrog
development for the country.
From the above analysis, we can conclude: first,
institutional reform may precede and compensate for
the shortage in technology to a certain extent in the
current stage in emerging countries, changing techno-
logical disadvantages to country specific advantages.
Second, a government may provide financial and fiscal
support for MNEs OFDI by relying on macro financial
advantages, deepening financial markets reform and
the degree of openness, and improving capital alloca-
tion efficiency. Third, although the economic devel-
opment level is usually preceded by OFDI in emerging
markets, more attention should be paid to matchingeconomic development to OFDI development. Finally,
each government should pay attention to the avail-
ability of OFDI policies and avoid becoming a capital
flight channel for OFDI to not be adverse to the
economy and employment development in the home
country.
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